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Answered: - Please help with the definitions and the questions on this study


Please help with the definitions and the questions on this study sheet.


POS 310 ? INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

 


 

The Midterm Examination is two hours long and covers material from Modules 1?4 of the course. It

 

consists of 30 multiple choice questions and 2 essay questions.

 

The Final Examination is two hours long and covers material from Modules 5?9 of the course. It consists

 

of 35 multiple choice questions and 2 essay questions.

 


 

?globalism.? - Globalization is the process of ideas, products, and people moving around the planet with

 

greater ease and efficiency. Globalization takes advantage of cheaper labor in less developed nations but

 

increases free trade between nations and the free flow of capital.

 

An historical period - an era of history having some distinctive feature

 


 

An economic phenomenon ?

 

We come to our announced topic, the economic phenomenon. Modern society exhibits a vast

 

development of technology, and correlatively, a vast advance in the scope and channels of social

 

administration?and correlatively, a vast increase in the complexity and scope of production, transport,

 

and consumption of use-values. The latter make up the physical economy. It might be thought of as

 

technology or engineering by someone for whom economics begins with commodification. However, its

 

sociality makes it very different from engineering in the usual sense. At any rate, just this physical

 

economy warrants a discipline which describes it, measures it, ponders its manifold dynamics. The

 

discipline would be quantitative and network-conscious because the subject-matter itself is.

 

But then there is something else. The entire phenomenon is commodified. All use-values are

 

property. Delivery of a use-value typically means an exchange of property for an equivalent in an

 

auction. Its paradigm, then, is the trade; everybody all the time is engaged in trade. (But the emphasis

 

which Neoclassical economics puts on the trader?s autonomous choice is ideological.) As for production,

 

its paradigm is the industrialist and factories. (Not the household or school, which, in a less ideological

 

perspective, would not have to be separated in conception from production.) Work is sold to an owner

 

by workers. Workers spend most of their time working?and that is what a physical perspective would

 

see?but all that commodity economics sees is the very small amount of time the worker spends making

 

the wage bargain with the employer.

 

The circumstance that the vast system is steered, or at least locally steered, by trades is mindboggling. (But not so mind-boggling if we remember that in reality, equilibration is not painless.)

 

Beyond that there is financialization. Money, borrowing, and the secondary market in IOUs.

 

Green pieces of paper are treated as use-values. Wealth is a vast pyramid of debt. Wealth becomes a

 


 

vast financial illusion. The relation between the physical world and the world of fictions is inverted. The

 

availability of loans comes to control the possibility of economic activity at all. A constitutive illusion

 

called inflation becomes an urgent concern. What is this at all? How has human survival become

 

dependent on the stipulation and transmission of trillionfold illusions? To that has to be added the

 

unique phenomenon of taxation. And that returns us to the institutional side of it, because the state

 

acts as guarantor of property and contracts (for example)?in the broadest senses. Another institutional

 

fact: the state has made the interest rate a policy variable. That is an incredible development, a

 

cancellation of laissez-faire from above.

 

It is entirely quantitative?and the physical is interwoven with the fictitious (prices and money).

 

One of the goals of the discipline has to be to account for this vast network of quantified phenomena, all

 

human-made.

 

But that is only the beginning, because there are so many dimensions to it. Economies have

 

overarching behavioral principles. In this society, engineering is not a neutral discipline; it is inseparable

 

from Neoclassical economics. In a certain sense, if Neoclassical economics were discarded, nothing of

 

the physical economy would be left. Even physics is inseparable from Neoclassical economics: the

 

action principle. Engineers maximize several physical goals simultaneously?how? By adding them

 

together with ?weights??prices, in effect?to get objective functions. No engineer knows how to design

 

an automobile without commodification. No engineer can discuss capital construction without interest

 

rates.

 

Another dimension. Determined attempts have been made by ?radical economists? to show that

 

some activities consist in the ?cheating? of one group by another, in the guise of a ?fair trade.? Capitalist

 

exploitation; imperialist exploitation. I write about that?I don?t blame people for suspecting that there

 

is such a thing as a ?windfall to the capitalist role,? for example?but the received arguments of this

 

nature such as Marx?s labor-power?well, they haven?t convinced.

 


 

Two questions of the greatest breadth may be asked. Let us take the speculative question first.

 

Is an economy possible at an advanced technical level which treats property and behavioral

 

imperatives entirely differently? (The question of communism, collectivism, abolition of profitmaximization and prices.) We do not speak of a mere policy, reversible after the next election or change

 

of dictator, but of the accession to a higher civilization.

 

Pursuant to this question, certain fundamental observations about capitalism come to the

 

forefront. Property rights do not inhere in the human condition. Private property is appropriation.

 

(Who owns people, who owns the air, who owns time?) Then, to posit relative efficiency as an

 

economy-wide goal is ideological posturing. (It describes no economic system, certainly not capitalism.)

 

From a communist vantage-point, then, market equilibrium is an equilibrium of force and fraud. All

 

prices are invidious constructs (more so than IQs, for example).

 


 

Most of my work in economics has explored this subject-matter?has been concerned to theorize

 

the economics of a higher civilization. But clearly this subject-matter is not the order of the day, not

 

remotely. It is far in advance of a political program. Moreover, the question of whether a higher

 

civilization is ?good? has to be treated cautiously. It could be, for example, that in a higher civilization

 

nobody would own a stock of jewels as a store of wealth. (How about a slave to fan you in hot

 

weather?) Some people will always consider that a deprivation. We are abstracting from what I would

 

call anachronistic privilege; we ask whether we can imagine anything that would be coherent and

 

feasible. We are competing not with Gerard Debreu but with Freeman Dyson.

 


 

Our second question is down-to-earth. What is the economic phenomenon in our time, what is

 

its measure, what are its behavioral patterns, how does it change in the large? In recent years I have

 

done more work on this question, all preliminary. Let me say at the outset that to idealize the free

 

market mathematically in order to prove the existence of an equilibrium which is also optimum is

 

ideological trash. My research excludes any such exercise.

 

One side of a descriptive investigation would be to delineate actual system flows. Physical inputoutput models, or linear models with joint products and depreciation, give a foretaste of the apparatus

 

required. Because of capital wear etc., such modeling already goes far beyond any lay discourse on the

 

economy. The utilization of the modeling apparatus cannot be dictated by Walrasian idealization to

 

secure ideological results. When there is unemployment, for example, the researcher must register it

 

without being argumentative or coy.

 

Then the pecuniary magnitudes which are operative in the economy need to be tracked.

 

Empirical prices, interest rates, money supplies, volume of debt, etc. Again, there are various realities

 

which embarrass the ideologues which must be registered without being argumentative or coy. The

 

state sets the governing interest rate (abolishing the free market at the core). Then?it is normal for

 

markets to be rigged. The analysis of price-determination in markets would look nothing like the

 

Neoclassical model.

 

There certainly are phenomena of demand in market behavior. Substitute and complementary

 

products can be observed; one can attempt to test elasticities of demand statistically (if one is willing to

 

accept results that belie Neoclassical theory). On the other hand, the deduction of demand for coffee or

 

rice from the autonomous psyche is ideological nonsense.

 

As for pecuniary indices which governments have created for administrative purposes, such as

 

?inflation? or GNP, whether economics need to recognize them even as an operative fiction is an open

 

question.

 

I am sneaking up on a critical analysis of the existing economy by making qualitative studies of this or

 

that piece of commercial activity.

 


 

a) What businessmen actually do. (Enron etc. etc.) It can never be spoken about in school for obvious

 

reasons: the Establishment and the criminals are one and the same.

 

b) Special sectors, such as lending, i.e. interest as income. Although Neoclassical economics legitimates

 

lending at interest, economic institutions continue to treat lending as highly suspect. The possibility of

 

economic activity at all is dependent on a line of business which continues to be highly suspect, like

 

selling addictive drugs.

 


 

The triumph of American values ?

 

1. The Founders believed that unnecessary government is dangerous and destructive of the moral

 

character of its people.

 


 

2. Character begins in taking responsibility for oneself. State involvement, when a person can care for

 

himself, damages moral character and reduces care for the truly needy.

 


 

3. Government entitlement programs have terrible moral consequences. These programs lead to a loss

 

of self-worth, an attitude of entitlement, and a lack of gratitude for what is provided. Why work if the

 

government provides a handout?

 


 

4. People need the emotional reward of feeling needed. Men especially have been denied rewards for

 

their involvement. When the State becomes totally responsible for the financial support of their women

 

and children, men are denied this reward. As the State expands its role, nothing is left of liberty and

 

dignity.

 


 

5. American churches and other voluntary groups have been an essential part of American culture that

 

becomes denigrated when government expands into their role. Charity and volunteerism are reduced

 

substantially in leftist states, a detriment to the needy and to the volunteers' sense of community

 

contribution.

 


 

Another jewel. "There are fine individuals on the left and selfish individuals on the Right. But as a rule,

 

bigger government increases the number of angry, ungrateful, lazy, spoiled and self-centered

 

individuals."

 


 

And another jewel. "The Left's altruistic motives have created the Welfare state, and the Welfare state

 

creates selfishness."

 


 

Prager's book discusses all the many underlying philosophical differences between conservatives and the

 

Obama left, and in my opinion, he discloses the fallacy underlying all the liberal concepts. Prager

 

discusses how the Age of Reason's and the Enlightenment's rejection of religion and God resulted in the

 

rejection of the concept of the inherent immorality of man -- a rejection which took over Europe.

 

Contrary to this European post-Enlightenment concept, the Founders retained in the Constitution the

 

concepts that man is immoral and that the essence of man is most interested in self-satisfaction. This

 

led the Founders to incorporate Montesquieu's advice in the Constitution and to create three branches

 

of government in which each branch had equal power. This was their attempt to counter the inherent

 

self-interest and immorality of man. It is my dream that a clear-thinking philosophy major would use

 

Prager's book to generate a short version for consumption by independents. Such a text would help the

 

world appreciate the inherent weaknesses underlying the social democracy of the Obama

 

administration.

 

A social and technological revolution - Technological revolution is (in general meaning) a relatively not

 

long period in history when one technology (or better a set of technologies) is replaced by another

 

technology (or by the set of technologies). As Nick Bostrom wrote: ?We might define a technological

 

revolution as a dramatic change brought about relatively quickly by the introduction of some new

 

technology.? [1] It is an era of an accelerated technological progress characterized not only by new

 

innovations but also their application and diffusion. A new technological revolution should increase a

 

productivity of work, efficiency, etc. It may involve not only material changes but also changes in

 

management, learning, social interactions, financing, methods of research etc. It is not limited strictly to

 

technical aspects. Technological revolution so rewrites the material conditions of human existence and

 

also reshape culture, society and even human nature. It can play a role of a trigger of a chain of various

 

and unpredictable changes.[4]

 

"What distinguishes a technological revolution from a random collection of technology systems and

 

justifies conceptualizing it as a revolution are two basic features:

 

1. The strong interconnectedness and interdependence of the participating systems in their technologies

 

and markets.

 

2. The capacity to transform profoundly the rest of the economy (and eventually society)."[5]

 

The consequences of a technological revolution are not exclusively positive - for example, it can have

 

negative environmental impact and cause a temporal unemployment (so called technological

 

unemployment).

 

The concept of technological revolution is based on the idea (not unquestioned) that technological

 

progress is not linear but undulatory. Technological revolution can be:

 


 

sectoral (more technological changes in one sector, e.g. Green revolution, Commercial revolution)

 

universal (interconnected radical changes in more sectors, the universal technological revolution can be

 

seen as a complex of several parallel sectoral technological revolutions, e.g. Second industrial revolution,

 

Renaissance technological revolution etc.)

 


 

The annihilation of distance -

 


 

Levels of analysis -

 


 

Evolving modern history -

 


 

Foreign policy ?

 


 

On power - Power is a central concept in international relations, but its meaning is contested.

 

Predominately, it is understood as control over resources, others, and/or outcomes; however, scholars

 

increasingly recognize that these conceptions of power are inadequate. Progress towards a more

 

sophisticated understanding of power relations is hampered by outdated meta-theoretical assumptions

 

about the structure of concepts. At the heart of many debates about contested concepts lies the

 

assumption that definitions must capture a singular, unifying essence of concepts, and that specifications

 

of sub-types must be contained within the bounds specified by one overarching definition. Recent

 

developments in cognitive science reveal that these assumptions?prevalent in the Western political

 

thought?are untenable. Dispensing with these assumptions makes room for a richer understanding of

 

the different types of power. It allows us to develop a typology of power that includes not only the

 

dimension of power that is associated with domination, coercion, oppression, exploitation, military

 

might, and violence, but also the dimension that relates to the capacity of a collectivity to stabilize and

 


 

shape political order based on a horizontal social contract. These two dimensions cannot be contained

 

under one overarching definition of power.

 


 

World affairs since the end of the Cold War have made it clear that the traditional view of power is too

 

narrow. In this context, I argue that Hannah Arendt's conception of power as corresponding, in her

 

words, ?to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert,? offers invaluable insights. I build on

 

Arendt's insights about horizontally generated power to distinguish four different types of power in

 

international relations: coercive power, bargaining power, concerted power, and political power. Coercive

 

power and bargaining power are different forms of ?power as control?. They depend on military and

 

economic resources. My explication and analyses of concerted power and political power provide

 

grounds to believe that it may be possible to replace political dynamics in which violence always looms

 

as an immediate, if implicit, threat with dynamics that relegate violence to the margins?even in

 

relations between states.

 


 

Anarchy as the essence of international life - Power is a central concept in international relations, but its

 

meaning is contested. Predominately, it is understood as control over resources, others, and/or

 

outcomes; however, scholars increasingly recognize that these conceptions of power are inadequate.

 

Progress towards a more sophisticated understanding of power relations is hampered by outdated metatheoretical assumptions about the structure of concepts. At the heart of many debates about contested

 

concepts lies the assumption that definitions must capture a singular, unifying essence of concepts, and

 

that specifications of sub-types must be contained within the bounds specified by one overarching

 

definition. Recent developments in cognitive science reveal that these assumptions?prevalent in the

 

Western political thought?are untenable. Dispensing with these assumptions makes room for a richer

 

understanding of the different types of power. It allows us to develop a typology of power that includes

 

not only the dimension of power that is associated with domination, coercion, oppression, exploitation,

 

military might, and violence, but also the dimension that relates to the capacity of a collectivity to

 

stabilize and shape political order based on a horizontal social contract. These two dimensions cannot be

 

contained under one overarching definition of power.

 


 

World affairs since the end of the Cold War have made it clear that the traditional view of power is too

 

narrow. In this context, I argue that Hannah Arendt's conception of power as corresponding, in her

 

words, ?to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert,? offers invaluable insights. I build on

 

Arendt's insights about horizontally generated power to distinguish four different types of power in

 

international relations: coercive power, bargaining power, concerted power, and political power. Coercive

 

power and bargaining power are different forms of ?power as control?. They depend on military and

 

economic resources. My explication and analyses of concerted power and political power provide

 

grounds to believe that it may be possible to replace political dynamics in which violence always looms

 


 

as an immediate, if implicit, threat with dynamics that relegate violence to the margins?even in

 

relations between states.

 


 

The role of balance of power - The balance of power theory in international relations suggests that

 

national security is enhanced when military capability is distributed so that no one state is strong enough

 

to dominate all others.[1] If one state becomes much stronger than others, the theory predicts that it

 

will take advantage of its strength and attack weaker neighbors, thereby providing an incentive for those

 

threatened to unite in a defensive coalition. Some realists maintain that this would be more stable as

 

aggression would appear unattractive and would be averted if there was equilibrium of power between

 

the rival coalitions.[1]

 

When confronted by a significant external threat, states that look to form alliances may "balance" or

 

"bandwagon". Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, while states that

 

have bandwagoned have aligned with the threat.[2] States may also employ other alliance tactics, such

 

as buck-passing and chain-ganging. There is a longstanding debate among realists with regard to how the

 

polarity of a system impacts on which tactic states use,[3] however, it is generally agreed that balancing

 

is more efficient in bipolar systems as each great power has no choice but to directly confront the other.

 

[4] Along with debates between realists about the prevalence of balancing in alliance patterns, other

 

schools of international relations, such as constructivists, are also critical of the balance of power theory,

 

disputing core realist assumptions regarding the international system and the behavior of states.[5]

 


 

Alliances - Alliance, in international relations, a formal agreement between two or more states for

 

mutual support in case of war. Contemporary alliances provide for combined action on the part of two or

 

more independent states and are generally defensive in nature, obligating allies to join forces if one or

 

more of them is attacked by another state or coalition. Although alliances may be informal, they are

 

typically formalized by a treaty of alliance, the most critical clauses of which are those that define the

 

casus foederis, or the circumstances under which the treaty obligates an ally to aid a fellow member.

 


 

Alliances arise from states? attempts to maintain a balance of power with each other. In a system

 

composed of a number of medium-size countries, such as that in Europe since the Middle Ages, no single

 

state is able to establish a lasting hegemony over all the others, largely because the other states join

 

together in alliances against it. Thus, the repeated attempts by King Louis XIV of France (reigned 1643?

 

1715) to dominate continental Europe led to a coalition in opposition to France and eventually to the

 

War of the Grand Alliance; and the ambitions of Napoleon were similarly thwarted by a series of

 

alliances formed against him.

 


 

Although typically associated with the Westphalian states system and the European balance of power,

 

alliances have taken shape on other continents and in other eras. In his classic work Artha-??stra (c. 300

 

bc), Kau?ilya, an adviser to Indian king Chandragupta, argued that in pursuing alliances countries should

 

seek support and assistance from distant states against the menace of neighbouring ones (according to

 

the logic that the enemy of one?s enemy must be one?s friend). The legacy of colonialism in Africa

 

retarded the development of collective-defense schemes there, but elsewhere in the developing world

 

alliances played a critical role in the evolving regional balance. For example, in the 1865?70 Paraguayan

 

War, the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay devastated Paraguay, reducing its territorial

 

possessions as well as its population by about 60 percent. Until the Cold War in the last half of the 20th

 

century, ideology was not usually a significant factor in the formation of such coalitions. For example, in

 

1536 Francis I, the Roman Catholic king of France, joined with the Ottoman sultan S?leyman I, who was a

 

Muslim, against the Holy Roman emperor Charles V, another Catholic, because Charles?s possessions

 

almost encircled France. Similarly, in World War II Great Britain and the United States allied themselves

 

with the communist Soviet Union in order to defeat Nazi Germany.

 


 

A new level of alliance building in Europe was reached in the late 19th century, when enmity between

 

Germany and France polarized Europe into two rival alliances. By 1910 most of the major states of

 

Europe belonged to one or the other of these great opposing alliances: the Central Powers, whose

 

principal members were Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the Allies, composed of France, Russia, and

 

Great Britain. This bipolar system had a destabilizing effect, since conflict between any two members of

 

opposing blocs carried the threat of general war. Eventually, a dispute between Russia and AustriaHungary in 1914 quickly drew their fellow bloc members into the general conflict that became known as

 

World War I (1914?18). The war?s outcome was effectively decided when the United States abandoned

 

its traditional isolationism and joined the Allied side in 1917 as one of several ?Associated? Powers.

 


 

The Allied victors sought to ensure the postwar peace by forming the League of Nations, which operated

 

as a collective security agreement calling for joint action by all its members to defend any individual

 

member or members against an aggressor. A collective security agreement differs from an alliance in

 

several ways: (1) it is more inclusive in its membership, (2) the target of the agreement is unnamed and

 

can be any potential aggressor, including even one of the signatories, and (3) the object of the

 

agreement is the deterrence of a potential aggressor by the prospect that preponderant power will be

 

organized and brought to bear against him. The League of Nations became demonstrably ineffective by

 

the mid-1930s, however, after its members declined to use force to stop aggressive acts by Japan, Italy,

 

and Germany.

 


 

These three countries soon formed...

 


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